University of Rhode Island

DigitalCommons@URI
Open Access Master's Theses
2021

INSTITUTIONALIZING RESILIENCE: INSIGHTS FROM
ASSESSMENT INITIATIVES AT SEAPORTS
Ellis Kalaidjian
University of Rhode Island, ekalaidjian@uri.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses

Recommended Citation
Kalaidjian, Ellis, "INSTITUTIONALIZING RESILIENCE: INSIGHTS FROM ASSESSMENT INITIATIVES AT
SEAPORTS" (2021). Open Access Master's Theses. Paper 1944.
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses/1944

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Open Access Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.

INSTITUTIONALIZING RESILIENCE: INSIGHTS FROM
ASSESSMENT INITIATIVES AT SEAPORTS
BY
ELLIS HOWARD KALAIDJIAN

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
IN
MARINE AFFAIRS

UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND
2021

MASTER OF ARTS THESIS
OF
ELLIS HOWARD KALAIDJIAN

APPROVED:
Thesis Committee:
Major Professor Austin Becker
Dawn Kotowicz
Douglas Hales
Brenton DeBoef
DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND
2021

ABSTRACT
Academics and practitioners advocate climate change resilience assessments to guide
seaport management, planning, and capital improvements. Yet, questions remain regarding
how resilience assessments actually influence planning cultures and result in better
prepared seaport organizations. Through 10 case studies of U.S. seaport resilience
assessments, this research identifies key benefits and challenges associated with executing
resilience assessments, resilience building actions that seaports pursue after completing a
resilience assessment, and how resilience assessments enhance seaport adaptive capacity.
Results suggest that resilience assessment processes enhanced, inter alia, seaports’ social
capital with their internal and external stakeholders, and that seaports frequently identified
and pursued infrastructure-related resilience enhancement strategies after completing an
assessment. Further, while key informants emphasize new networks and collaborations
following their assessments as benefits, they also frequently cited them as key challenges
in the assessment process. Additional takeaways captured in this research provide valuable
insights that can inform guidance materials designed to help seaports undertake their
resilience endeavors.
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1. Introduction
Resilience has been proposed as a new paradigm for complex systems management in
the face of the evolving risks and deep uncertainties associated with climate change
(Linkov et al., 2014). Calls for climate change resilience are especially prevalent in
discourses on the maritime transportation system (MTS) (Becker et al., 2012; Becker et al.,
2014; Ng et al., 2018) due to its inherent vulnerabilities to climate hazards such as sea level
rise and changes in severe storm climatologies (Asariotis & Benamara, 2012). To date,
however, it is not well understood how seaports operationalize long-term resilience
management and whether undertaking planning initiatives enhances their capacities to
prepare for, sustain, recover and learn from, and adapt to climate hazards (Chhetri et al.,
2020). Instead, much academic inquiry has focused on institutional barriers to seaport
resilience-building (e.g., Mclean & Becker, 2019) or developing theoretical approaches to
assessing seaport resilience (e.g., Morris & Sempier, 2016). Further, measures such as
resilience-related policy interventions and institutional arrangements are underexplored,
constituting a key knowledge gap regarding how resilience concepts are built into existing
management structures to seaport adaptive capacity. This dearth in knowledge serves as
the impetus of this research, which explores how seaports that have undertaken systematic
approaches to identifying and planning for their climate risks, referred to here as resilience
assessments, have institutionalized resilience. Specifically, the objectives of this work are
threefold: (1) to elucidate the key benefits and challenges or limitations associated with
undertaking resilience assessment interventions; (2) to identify the resilience-building
actions that seaports pursue after completing resilience assessments; and (3) to determine
the extent to which resilience assessments enhance seaports’ capacities to manage and
1

adapt to climate hazards. The proceeding sections of this thesis are as follows: first, a brief
review of the key tenets of resilience theory is provided, followed by a discussion of the
resilience assessment process and the roles it can play in facilitating adaptive capacity. The
conversation then shifts to seaports—why they’re valuable case studies of resilience
institutionalization and relevant research on seaport resilience-building. Finally, the
introduction concludes with a review of research on resilience institutionalization in
practice to identify key knowledge gaps and convey the exigence of this research.
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2. Background
2.1 Understanding resilience
The epistemological contributions to resilience theory are primarily sourced from
1960s and 70s ecological research investigating ecosystem responses to perturbations
(Folke, 2006). In particular, the modeling studies of C.S. Holling are widely regarded as
the place of origin of the resilience perspective (Folke, 2006). In his seminal paper on
ecosystem resilience and stability, Holling (1973) introduced resilience as the level of
perturbation required to push an ecosystem from one stable state, or “basin of attraction,”
beyond a threshold to another basin of attraction with different structural and functional
properties (Carpenter et al., 2001; Folke, 2006). Holling proposed that “resilience
determines the persistence of relationships within a system and is a measure of the ability
of these systems to absorb changes of state variables, driving variables, and parameters,
and still persist” (Holling, 1973, p. 17). The broader notion of persistence in the face of
adversity has since been regarded as paramount to the resilience concept (Folke, 2006;
Gallopín, 2006; Lei et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2010; Quinlan et al., 2016; Smit & Wandel,
2006). Resilience theory further acknowledges the susceptibility of systems to incremental
and abrupt periods of change, and that the underlying drivers of change are nonlinear and
not easily identifiable. Hence, uncertainty is an indispensable concept to resilience, and
resilience serves as a unique framework of planning around uncertainty (Wilkinson, 2012).
Since the 1970s, resilience has received widespread attention in myriad academic
discourses that are far removed from its place of origin, such as urban planning,
cybersecurity, disaster risk reduction, and emergency management (Folke, 2006; Gallopín,
2006; Lei et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2010; Quinlan et al., 2016; Smit & Wandel, 2006). The
3

expansion of ecological resilience to the social science disciplines represents a notable
ontological transformation regarding the human-nature relationship that has manifested as
the social-ecological system construct (Adger et al., 2005). The application of resilience to
social-ecological systems expands its scope to include the cognitive abilities of humans,
such as the capacities to adjust the system’s processes to remain in its current state or to
establish new processes to shift to a possibly improved state (Carpenter et al., 2001).
Social-ecological resilience also includes the capacities to reorganize after a disturbance
and learn from past disturbances to adjust system management measures as the context
changes (Djalante et al., 2012). This expanded form of resilience is evoked in the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) definition of resilience as: “the
capacity of social, economic, and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event
or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential
function, identity and structure, while also maintaining the capacity for adaptation,
learning, and transformation” (IPCC, 2014). Similarly, the National Academy of Science
(NAS, 2012) defines critical infrastructure resilience as, “the ability to prepare, resist,
recover, and more successfully adapt to the impacts of adverse events.”
The notion of developing with change introduces the interrelated concept of adaptive
capacity, which reflects features of a system that enable it to “modify or change its
characteristics or behavior so as to cope better with existing or emerging external stresses”
(Adger et al., 2004, p. 34). Adaptive capacity relates to the institutions, structures,
capabilities, and networks that allow a system to learn and store knowledge and experience
to enhance its functional resilience to hazards (Smit & Wandel, 2006). The concept is
commonly assessed qualitatively by analyzing institutional barriers impeding systems’
4

ability to learn and adapt (Moser et al., 2010). For example, in seaport and non-seaport
contexts, common barriers include a dearth of financial and intellectual resources,
hindering the ability of systems to undertake often costly and complex resilience-building
efforts (Moser et al., 2019). Yet, while seaports of high financial and intellectual means
may have the resources needed for resilience enhancement, they may not be committed to
this agenda, leading to inaction. Similarly, a lack of leadership to champion the resiliencebuilding effort serves as another barrier (Becker & Kretsch, 2019). Given the
transboundary impacts of climate change, commitment, leadership, and expertise within
one organization may only be so useful; an entity that bears the burden of climate change
through resource sharing and collaboration with internal and external actors is more likely
to sustain and successfully adapt with change (Adger et al., 2005; Bostick et al., 2017;
Djalante et al., 2012). The strength of a system’s adaptive capacity is also function of
factors such as the quality and availability of scientific data available for resilience
initiatives (Hayes et al., 2018), the stock of social capital, risk transferring mechanisms,
and the ability of decision makers to manage and process important information (Adger,
2003; Smit & Wandel, 2006).
This study conceives a resilient system as being able to do one or more of the
following: anticipate and plan for disturbances; sustain the impacts of disturbances without
crossing a threshold of system functionality loss; quickly recover back to pre-disturbance
functionality; and/or self-organize and learn from past experiences to adapt to emerging,
unforeseen circumstances (Folke, 2006; Miller et al., 2010; Smit & Wandel, 2006). A
resilient system must act, both ex ante and ex post disturbance, to identify, monitor, and
mitigate its vulnerabilities, and engage in periods of reflection and transformation—i.e.,
5

adapt—to cope with rampant stressors. The system’s capacity to execute such tasks is
enabled by its strong leadership, quality of data, social capital, redundancy, flexibility in
policies, and polycentric decision-making (Djalante et al., 2012; Folke, 2006; Holling,
1978; Miller et al., 2010).

2.2 Managing system resilience through the resilience assessment process and adaptive
governance
The concept of planning for and managing system resilience is a more recent
development in resilience literature that has emerged from the natural resource
management field (Wilkinson, 2012). Scholars propose resilience planning as a new
paradigm for managing risks, complexity, and uncertainty that is achieved through
collaborative, flexible, and learning-based approaches to governance (Chaffin et al., 2014).
Applying resilience concepts in strategic planning requires an understanding of how system
resilience is maintained and broken down, which, in turn, necessitates a holistic view of
the key functions driving the system’s operations and how they relate to each other. The
process of systematically obtaining such information and identifying opportunities for
resilience enhancement, is referred to as a resilience assessment (Quinlan et al., 2016;
Wilkinson, 2012). Resilience assessments may also be referred to as vulnerability
assessments, which represents the broader debate over the conceptual discrepancies
between resilience and vulnerability (Gallopín, 2006). While nuances may exist between a
resilience assessment and vulnerability assessment approach, the general frameworks and
endgoals are the same, and hence this paper considers them to be synonymous.

6

Resilience assessment builds upon adaptive management (Holling, 1978), panarchy
theory (Gunderson & Holling, 2002), and soft-systems methodology (Checkland, 1981).
The resilience assessment process is inclusive of risk assessment and has emerged in
response to its pitfalls by providing a framework that takes into account the inevitability of
unforeseen periods of gradual and rapid disruptions, and leaving in flexibility to account
for emerging information that may facilitate future adaptations (Davoudi, 2012; Shaw,
2012; Wilkinson, 2012). Further, unlike siloed attempts to manage risks of individual
system components, the resilience assessment process necessitates consideration and
participation of all system constituents, as it serves to obtain holistic knowledge.
Incorporating resilience into existing planning processes involves designing an assessment
that will help stakeholders agree on system vulnerabilities and evaluate alternative actions
to successfully prepare, absorb, recover, and adapt to future hazards.

2.3 The seaport: A great case study of resilience planning
This section examines seaports and why they are exemplar environments to study
resilience in practice. It is important to first define what is considered a seaport. From a
research perspective, the scope used to distinguish seaports from non-seaports is
complicated by the lack of a standardized definition in the literature. For example, seaports
can be defined by their geographical location or their accessibility by seagoing vessels
(Meersman et al., 2006). This study defines a seaport as the lands owned and managed by
a port authority, as this definition affords a better case study to understand how resilience
is built into organizations (as opposed to a geo-economic entity).

7

Climate change presents one of many hazards jeopardizing the MTS (USACE, 2021).
Seaports are necessarily located in coastal environments that are susceptible to sea level
rise (SLR) and storms, or at river mouths that are susceptible to flooding, and, unlike other
coastal entities, are unable to relocate their infrastructure to less vulnerable locations
(Asoriotis & Benamara, 2012). Yet, when it comes time to respond to climate change,
seaports’ physical and administrative complexities present immense challenges for
coordinated resilience-building efforts (Mclean & Becker, 2019). For one, comprehensive
investigations of the key components supporting a seaport system’s functionality are
considerable undertakings, as seaports’ day-to-day operations are governed by an array of
cargo handling equipment, storage facilities, navigation systems, channel maintenance
systems, business systems and software responsible for procuring, tracking and distributing
goods, and oversight systems responsible for monitoring port-related activities (USACE,
2021). Similarly, the process of identifying the key functionality thresholds of seaport
infrastructure systems is complicated by the vast network of interdependent relationships
that exist between them. Given that seaports are at the interface between maritime and
inland transportation modes, and thus collectively form intricate logistics and supply chain
networks (Montwiłł, 2014), understanding the geographic extent of consequences of
disruptions at one seaport also presents an immense challenge. Interruptions and
bottlenecks caused by SLR, storms, or flooding at one seaport facility can have cascading
impacts that extend outward to neighboring seaports and related sectors (Thekdi & Santos,
2016). For example, seaport shutdowns in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria halted the
distribution of key pharmaceutical supplies to more than half of the hospitals in the
mainland United States for months (Lawrence et al., 2020).
8

As a result of their physical complexities, decision-makers’ often lack nuanced
knowledge about climate change impacts to their seaports, which often induces
administrative paralysis around resilience (Becker et al., 2012). Seaport decision-makers
may also be skeptical about the efficacy of long-term strategizing for climate change
because it involves too many assumptions (Ng et al., 2018), which may gravitate their
attention towards more near-sighted resilience investments. For example, as Becker and
colleagues (2012) observed, seaport operators seldom considered time horizons beyond 10
years when planning for climate change because they are unsure of how to account for the
uncertainties within risk assessment products (e.g., sea-level rise projections) in planning
decisions.
Seaport ownership and governance arrangements further complicate their capacity for
resilience-building. Seaports often operate within private and public jurisdictions (Fawcett,
2006; Nursey-Bray, 2014). In some cases, the administration of a seaport may exist as an
enclave or municipal department housed within divisions of state, county or municipal
governments, and in others, it may exist as a political subdivision of its respective state
(Sherman, 2000). Moreover, seaport planning and decision-making takes place within a
complex web of multiple federal, state, and local agencies and non-governmental actors
who each have jurisdiction over or a stake in seaport activities (Winkelmans & Notteboom,
2007). Previous research has documented numerous institutional barriers to resiliencebuilding that arise from the vastness of seaports’ stakeholder clusters. For example, the
geographic scale and jurisdictional boundaries across which seaport infrastructure systems
operate, the distributed ownership of infrastructure, and the distributed responsibility for
risk management make cumbersome the task of identifying leadership to implement
9

resilience enhancement strategies (Becker & Kretsch, 2019). Because seaport operations
and investments are sourced from multiple public and private stakeholders, each with their
own authority, interest, and preferences, competing objectives amongst these groups may
hinder the implementation of resilience enhancement strategies (Moser et al., 2010; Shaw
et al., 2017). Conflicting objectives between stakeholders may also lead to
interorganizational information siloes that impede coordinated resilience decision-making
(Mclean & Becker, 2019; Shaw et al., 2017).
The complex realities that govern the MTS obscure understanding about how they will
perform under stress, which, paired with the inevitability of disruption due to any possible
natural and human hazards, justifies resilience as a subject of investigation for academia
and management objective for the seaport. Further, given the public and private duality
that characterizes seaports, the implications of resilience planning may extend to both
public and private sectors (particularly other public enterprises responsible for critical
infrastructure, such as telecommunications). This research argues that seaports constitute
exemplar and necessary case studies to investigate the efficacy of completing a resilience
assessment intervention to manage their complexities and the uncertainties posed by
climate change.

2.4 Different approaches to resilience assessment at seaports
Seaports may undertake a resilience assessment intervention for many reasons,
including long-term planning for future impacts of disruptive events, exploring best
practices and options available for a specific project or improvement, or satisfying a
government mandate. Seaports conduct resilience assessments through different
10

approaches depending on financial means, the scope of their planning objectives, time and
staff resource availability, and other context-dependent criteria. For example, seaports with
larger budgets may hire a consulting firm to lead the data collection, stakeholder outreach,
and reporting associated with the resilience assessment. Resilience assessments can also
be coordinated through Regional Resiliency Assessment Programs (RRAPs), which are led
by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal, state, and local partners
and are of no cost to the seaport (DHS, 2016). Another less-involved and less costly
approach available to seaports is to consult self-assessment tools, such as the Ports
Resilience Index, which convenes seaport stakeholders in a day-long workshop to answer
questions regarding the seaport’s capacity to maintain operations during and after
disruptions (Morris & Sempier, 2016).
While resilience assessments may be conducted at various scales and tailored to
specific needs and contexts, the process is typically underpinned by four key stages that
are interconnected within an iterative framework, as follows (EPA, 2018; NIST, 2016;
PIANC, 2020; USACE, 2021):
1) Defining functions and characterizing the system in steady state – This stage is
concerned with identifying the functions performed by the seaport and
understanding normal operations, including key port stakeholders and operators,
governance structures, planning activities, and characteristics of port activities.
Procedures include: outlining the aims and objectives of the assessment; scoping
the assessment; developing a comprehensive problem statement and research
questions; inventorying all assets, operations, and systems that make up the
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infrastructural landscape of the port; identifying relevant stakeholders and
opportunities for partner engagement; and, identifying and compiling relevant data.
2) Identifying critical infrastructure and dependencies – In this stage, key assets of
the system that support its critical functions are identified and the condition and/or
capabilities of assets and their locations are determined.
3) Understanding the impacts of disruptive events – This step encompasses both risk
assessment and recovery assessment. It brings together climate hazard information,
allowing practitioners to analyze baseline and projections data to understand the
typical characteristics of each relevant baseline and future climate parameter or
process to gauge what threats and hazards could disrupt critical functions. This
effort will provide a basis of understanding of how the system will perform under
stress.
4) Developing and evaluating resilience enhancement strategies – Lastly, resilience
enhancement strategies, based on the assessment findings in stage three, are
identified, screened, and evaluated, at which point adaptation strategies can be
prepared and implemented. For seaports, a resilience enhancement strategy refers
to any institutional, economic, or infrastructural measure taken improve a seaport’s
ability to absorb and weaken the impacts of hazards on its assets, operations, and
systems (e.g., forming a resilience committee or building a protective seawall).
This study will focus on 10 U.S. case study seaports that have completed a resilience
assessment to identify where in this process that key benefits and challenges arise, and how
the implementation of resilience enhancement strategies is executed after completing the
resilience assessment process.
12

3. Methods
This research employed a qualitative case study approach to understand benefits and
challenges of planning for and building resilience through resilience assessments at 10
seaports, and how such efforts can enhance the adaptive capacity of a complex, multilayered system. Qualitative research is a superior approach when exploring understudied
concepts or phenomena (Creswell, 2017), especially given the paucity of research on the
topic of resilience institutionalization via resilience assessments at seaports. Further,
quantitative evaluations of the theoretical concepts explored in this research—resilience,
adaptive capacity, and so forth—are of limited utility given the lack of consensus on
appropriate standardized methodologies.

3.1 Case study selection
To guide this research and help ensure that results would be relevant and useful, we
convened and consulted a steering committee composed of members from the U.S. Army
Engineering Research and Design Center (ERDC) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (Table 1). The steering committee aided the scoping process and other
facets of the research design. The first initiative of this research was to scope candidate
resilience assessments for consideration as case studies. Case studies were chosen based
on the scope of the resilience work—where possible, this study focused on single-port scale
resilience assessments, as opposed to regional (i.e., multijurisdictional) assessments, as this
would make the informant selection process less cumbersome. Further, we considered a
resilience assessment as any planning effort that followed a methodology that fell within
the four-step iterative process described above and listed objectives of intending to identify
13

seaports’ operational and infrastructural capacities to plan for, respond to, and adapt to
climate hazards. Two additional criteria that factored into the selection approach were the
hazards investigated through the resilience assessment—this work sought seaport
resilience assessments that addressed SLR, coastal storms, and their associated hazards
(e.g., wind/flooding damage, saltwater intrusion, or erosion)—and the year of the
assessment’s completion having been within the last 10 years. While seaports are
threatened by myriad hazards, we selected these hazards to keep a narrow focus. The
research team then endeavored to identify US ports that had completed a resilience
assessment, or similar process, that fell within the scope.
Table 1 – Roles of steering committee members
Name
Margaret Kurth
Katherine Chambers
Jevon Daniel
Sandra Pinel

Title
Engineering Contractor

Affiliation

USACE ERDC

Asset Management Specialist
Project Manager

DHS CISA

Community and Regional
Planner

Using the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Principal Ports
database, we identified 115 U.S. coastal ports (i.e., both seaports and Great Lakes ports)
within 10 miles of the coastline (Figure 1). We then compiled the email addresses and
phone numbers of each coastal port’s executive director and/or environment-oriented staff
(e.g., a director of environmental affairs), where possible1, through web searches and
steering committee networks, with particular focus on medium and large shipping seaports

1

Some ports had very limited or outdated websites, while others had no websites at all, nor did they have
identifiable executive staff. These ports were thereby excluded from the search.
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with port authorities or agencies. After further vetting of the database and steering
committee assistance, we emailed (and, at times, called) 72 coastal ports to inquire about
the status of their resilience planning efforts. Because of competitive relationships that exist

Figure 1 – Map of all U.S. ports within 10 miles of the coastline

between ports, we strategically mentioned the names of other ports that had agreed to
participate in the study to enhance response rate and recruitment numbers. Overall, we
received 41 responses. A majority of the respondents indicated that their ports had not
completed resilience assessments, while other port representatives indicated that their ports
had completed resilience assessments but were unable to participate due to time constraints
associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. We held follow-up phone or video conference
calls with 19 seaports that claimed to have undertaken a resilience assessment process. Of
these 19, we included 10 in the study (Table 2), as the others (Appendix A) either did not
meet the scope of the research or were unable to participate because staff that were with
the seaport when their assessment was completed, were no longer employed.
15

Table 2 – List of seaport resilience assessment case studies. Note: Asterisks (*) indicate that seaports
have (or are in the process of) undertaken additional resilience assessments since (and/or before) the
one listed in the table.
Assessment
Approach

Contractor
Assessment
(6)

Port of

Year
Completed

Type(s) of Hazard(s) Assessed

# of
Pages

San Diego
(CA)*

2019

SLR, storm surge

298

2018

SLR, storm surge

108

2017

SLR, subsidence, storm surge, lightning
strike frequency, karst geology

47

Long Beach
(CA)*

2016

SLR, storm surge, extreme heat,
precipitation and riverine flooding,
extreme wind, ocean acidification

172

Seattle (WA)

2015

SLR, storm surge

26

Baltimore
(MD)*

2010

SLR, storm surge, extreme wind,
precipitation and riverine flooding

120

2016

Tsunami, earthquake, severe weather,
flooding, extreme heat, hurricanes,
hazmat release, erosion, wildfire, levee
failure

10

2012

Erosion, drought, earthquake, expansive
soils, severe weather, hurricanes, levee
failure, land subsidence, winter storm,
wildfire, hazmat release, pipeline failure

104

2018

Coastal hazards

24

2017

Coastal hazards

24

Los Angeles
(CA)*
Virginia
(VA)*

Grays Harbor
(WA)
Hazard
Mitigation Plan
(2)

Port Resilience
Index
(2)

Freeport
(TX)*
Morgan City
(LA)
Tampa Bay
(FL)*

Selected case studies fell into one of the following three categories based on the
resilience assessment approach they took:
(1) Assessments led by a private consultant, hereon referred to as “contractor
assessments;”
(2) Seaport-focused Hazard Mitigation Plans, which are developed under the
auspices of FEMA;
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(3) Seaports that used the Ports Resilience Index (PRI) self-assessment tool, a
qualitative resilience index which was developed by colleagues at Louisiana Sea
Grant.
The variability in resilience assessment approaches reflected the highly contextual nature
of resilience assessments. Seaports choose their approach depending on the scope of their
planning objectives, the granularity of vulnerability data they desire, the level of
stakeholder (internal versus external) engagement they sought, the seaport’s financial
means, time and staff resource availability, and other criteria. Further, the three approaches
were selected because seaport resilience initiatives in the US have only begun rather
recently (within the past 10 or so years), and these approaches capture the current scope of
resilience assessment work that has been completed to date. Comparisons across the three
approaches also allowed for a more robust investigation of seaport resilience assessments
given their variability in terms of, for example, the seaport’s involvement level in the
process (higher for the PRI and contractor assessment approaches; lower for the Hazard
Mitigation Plans, which may focus on many federal, state, and local stakeholders including
the seaport); the quality and types of data each approach yields (i.e., contractor assessments
and Hazard Mitigation plans usually focus on physical/infrastructure vulnerabilities and
yield highly detailed, quantitative data, while the PRI explores institutional vulnerabilities
to hazards and yields less detailed, qualitative data); the amount of time each process takes
(i.e., contractor assessments and Hazard Mitigation Plans may take years, while the PRI
approach may take less than a week); and their cost.2

2

Note: Other resilience assessment case studies were considered. For example, researchers identified
seaports that participated in their states’ Regional Resiliency Assessment Programs, which are led by the
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3.2 Key informant selection
Key informants (Error! Reference source not found.) were identified and selected p
urposively through the researchers’ preliminary phone calls with points of contact that
responded to our emails, or through steering committee correspondences. Informants were
invited to participate via
Table 3 – Description of select informants’ titles and responsibilities (N = 27)
Position

Number
Interviewed

Responsibilities

Directors or managers
Common titles:
(Deputy) Executive director
Director of operations
Chief information officer
Economic development manager

7

Run port operations and systems (short or long term)
Perform maintenance of vessels and facilities
Supervise employees
Manage specific functions of port facilities
Plan efficient use of port resources, with attention to
security, safety, and health of personnel

Environmental specialists
Common titles:
Director of environmental affairs
Manager of strategic planning
Environmental management specialist
Environmental manager
Project manager - sustainability
Climate mitigation and resilience manager

11

Monitor related environmental regulations
Oversee environmental protection and other social
responsibility functions

Engineers
Common titles:
Director of engineering
Director of construction & maintenance
Civil engineer

5

Manage/engage in engineering projects
Ensure compliance with safety regulations
Prepare & manage the engineering department’s budget
Coordinate with external stakeholders for new
integrations and tools

Safety planners
Common titles:
Vice president of sustainability
Director of protective services
General manager - operations & safety

4

Monitor and assess hazardous and unsafe situations
Develop guidelines for personnel safety

email and/or phone and were asked to provide consent by signing a consent form. Our
outreach approach was approved by the University of Rhode Island Institutional Review

DHS and convene federal, state, and local partners to identify regional resilience issues; however,
participant recruitment for these case studies was unsuccessful.
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Board (IRB Reference #: 1622078-2). Following Mclean & Becker (2019), we
concentrated on recruiting lead stakeholders who are internal to the seaport management
structure and typically make decisions related to their seaports’ climate resilience
endeavors—directors/managers, safety planners, engineers, and environmental specialists.
Where possible, we included staff members that led or were considerably involved with
their seaport’s assessment, since these individuals were deemed to have the most valuable
perspective for the research questions.

3.3 Data collection
We collected data through an online survey, followed by a focus group style interview.
For each case study, we conducted a preliminary document review process, which involved
compiling relevant information from each case study’s resilience assessment to be built
into the survey and interview instruments. The decision to use surveying and focus groups
interviews is justified in that it captures a more holistic picture of the phenomena under
investigation (Ziervogel et al. 2006a). —i.e., the institutional impact made on the case
studies by the resilience assessment process. This data collection format served to
neutralize the limitations of each approach in isolation—interviews are flexible and
adaptable, allowing researchers to explore research questions in more depth (Robson &
McCartan, 2016), while surveys require less time expenditure for informants and give the
phenomena under investigation measurability. Moreover, the triangulation of quantitative
and qualitative data is suggested to enhance data validity.
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3.3.1 Document review
The research team conducted systematic reviews of the 10 seaports’ resilience
assessment documents to tailor survey and interview instruments to each seaport, given the
contextual nature of resilience assessments (Figure 2). Some of these documents were
publicly available (e.g., those for Ports of San Diego and Long Beach) and were obtained
from the seaports’ websites, while others were obtained through email/phone
correspondences with points of contact at each seaport. The specific information collected
from each document included the start and end dates of the assessment effort, the
methodology that the seaport went through to complete the assessment, the key
vulnerability findings from the assessment, and the resilience enhancement strategies
recommended to the seaport. Using this information, we were able to ask questions about,
for example, specific resilience enhancements that the case studies had implemented and
any changes to building codes and land-use regulations, infrastructure design strategies, or
disaster response protocols that had been prompted by the resilience assessment.

Figure 2 – Example of the document review workflow
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3.3.2 Survey
Prior to interviewing, we asked key informants from each seaport to complete a brief
(10-15 minutes) online pre-survey. The survey was designed using Qualtrics and divided
into two sections, one of which intended to elicit data regarding the specific resilience
enhancement strategies that seaports implement after completing a resilience assessment
(i.e., data addressing RQ2). For all but two case studies, resilience assessment documents
listed strategies to address key organizational and physical vulnerabilities identified
through their assessment interventions. We asked informants two questions about each
strategy: (1) had their respective seaport implemented (or was it planning to implement)
the strategy after completing the assessment; and (2) how likely would the seaport have
identified and/or implemented the strategy in the absence of the assessment (Appendix B).
Both questions were measured on Likert scales. The first question used a Likert scale with
response options of Unsure, Will Not Be Implemented, May Be Implemented, Has Been
Implemented, and Will Be Implemented; the second question had the options of Unsure/not
applicable, Unlikely, and Likely. Surveys also allowed respondents to provide qualitative
data through an Other text box or Comments text box. Additionally, at the end of the
survey, respondents were asked to provide general comments regarding any information
that they felt was left out of the survey.
The second section of the survey gauged the institutional impacts of the resilience
assessment process on the 10 case studies (i.e., provided data addressing RQ3). Following
the format of Fu (2020), and informed by resilience and adaptive capacity literature (Adger,
2003a; Becker & Kretsch, 2019; Mansouri et al., 2010; Mclean & Becker, 2019; Morris,
2020; Shaw et al., 2017), we presented informants with the following 10 institutional
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capacities and asked them to rate their strength prior to and after the completion of their
resilience assessment:
(1) the seaport’s commitment to resilience-building;
(2) presence of leadership to champion the seaport’s resilience-building
endeavors;
(3) staff availability to work on resilience-building endeavors;
(4) data availability;
(5) data quality for resilience-building;
(6) financial resource availability;
(7) resource (staff, information, data, etc.) sharing across the seaport’s
departments;
(8) external stakeholder groups;
(9) collaboration with internal; and
(10) external stakeholders on resilience-building endeavors.
Each capacity was measured using a Likert scale from 1-5 with the options of Not Present,
Weak, Moderate, Strong, and Very Strong.

3.3.3 Focus group interviews
We held 12 internet-based interviews with 26 key informants from the 10 seaports.
Nine of the interviews were in focus groups of two to four individuals, and three interviews
were held individually with informants of the same seaport that could not participate
together due to scheduling conflicts. We chose the focus group approach over individual
interviewing because the use of “mini-focus groups” (i.e., groups of three or four
22

informants) is considered advantageous when participants have specialized knowledge
and/or experiences to discuss in the group (Krueger, 2014)—we felt such was the case for
the resilience assessment case studies. Further, qualitative methods literature has suggested
that the internet-based focus group format overcomes some of the methodological issues
arising from face-to-face focus groups. For example, Walston and Lissitz (2000) suggest
that group members that participate in virtual settings are less likely to withhold viewpoints
that they perceive as embarrassing or inflammatory, and are more likely to express dissent
with group members of higher positions, which is frequently cited as a shortcoming of the
focus group approach.
Interviews averaged 45-minutes in length and were conducted using Zoom video
conferencing software due to both spatial constraints and the social distancing protocols
mandated during the COVID-19 pandemic. All interviews were recorded and transcribed,
which was made known to informants prior to interviewing. To ensure data reliability, the
interview instrument (Appendix C) was vetted in consultation with the steering committee
members. Researchers also held two pilot interviews with members of academia and a civil
engineering consulting firm to ensure the language of questions was tailored appropriately
to the participant audience. Additionally, following the completion of each interview,
researchers wrote session summaries that summarized the data that were collected and
explained their relevance to the research questions and any general takeaways that were
considered important to the study. Memo-writing—recommended in grounded theory
research such as this (Charmaz, 2008)—was also employed along the course of the
research.
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The interview instrument was divided into four sections. The first section consisted of
introductory questions designed to better acquaint the researcher with the case study’s
resilience assessment, such as “what drove your organization to undertake the resilience
assessment?” and “what stakeholders were involved in your assessment?”. The second set
of questions focused on informants' perceptions of the key benefits or utilities of their
seaport’s resilience assessment, either those associated with the process itself or the final
assessment document. Similarly, the third section included questions about challenges that
the organization experienced along the course of the assessment process or limited aspects
of the assessment following its completion. The last section concluded with questions
regarding the resilience assessment’s institutional impacts, such as whether it change the
organization’s climate change planning culture or facilitated new networks with external
stakeholders.

3.4 Data analysis
The analysis phase was divided into several steps. First, during the document review
phase, we categorized the resilience enhancement strategies prescribed by each case
study’s assessment using six seaport-specific typologies from Becker and Caldwell (2015):
(1) Building codes and land use regulations (e.g., prohibiting the use of erosive
fill)
(2) Long-range planning (e.g., incorporating hazard mitigation into
transportation planning)
(3) Construction and design strategies – on and off port lands (e.g., building a
protective breakwater)
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(4) Emergency response, preparation and recovery (e.g., creating evacuation plan
and procedures)
(5) Research (e.g., conducting risk and vulnerability assessments)
(6) Networks and new ways of thinking (e.g., establishing climate change
working groups with internal and external stakeholders)
These categories would be used later in the analysis of survey data. Then, we thematically
coded the interview data. The next sections describe these procedures.
3.4.1 Survey data
We received survey responses from 19 of the 27 informants. All survey data was
compiled in IBM SPSS Statistics (Version 26) and analyzed in aggregate. Data from the
first section of the survey—i.e., the resilience enhancements that had or had not been
implemented—was grouped under one of the six typologies described above. Researchers
tallied the total number of mentioned strategies per typology, along with the total numbers
of strategies that had been or will be implemented, may be implemented, were not
implemented, or those about which participants were unsure. In some instances, resilience
enhancements were mentioned in interviews, so we included them in this dataset. Total
counts of respondents who felt that a given resilience enhancement was likely or unlikely
to have been identified and implemented in the absence of the assessment were also
collected for each strategy. At times, there were discrepancies between responses from
informants of the same seaport—for example, one respondent may have been unsure
whether a given enhancement was implemented, while another indicated that the same
strategy was not implemented. In such cases, we used best judgement based on the job title
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and strategy type to select the response to be recorded in the data—for example, if a
seaport’s engineering department director indicated that a seawall retrofit had not been
implemented, but the emergency manager of the same port responded as unsure, we
deferred to and collected the former’s response. In cases where only one informant from
the seaport responded to the survey, only his/her data was collected. Once all counts were
recorded, we ran a Fisher’s Exact test to investigate whether a statistically significant
relationship existed between the resilience enhancement typology and the extent of
implementation.
Data from the second section of the survey—the pre- and post-assessment institutional
capacities strengths—were averaged across the 19 responses. Intra- and inter-case-study
discrepancies also existed in this dataset, as some respondents indicated a change in the
institutional capacity strength after the assessment, while others did not. We therefore
counted the number of responses that did and did not indicate a change after the assessment
to account for this variability.
3.4.2 Interview data
The second portion of the analysis involved qualitative coding of the interview data to
identify emerging themes and patterns within informants’ responses to interview prompts
regarding the usefulness and challenging aspects of undertaking resilience assessments.
After the transcription of the interviews, the research team coded transcripts line-by-line
using the Atlas.ti v9 (Friese, 2019) qualitative data analysis software package. The coding
scheme used an iterative process based on grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). Statements
characterized as having a positive impact on or utility value to the seaport were coded as
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benefits of the resilience assessment process; statements evoking sentiments of difficulty
or limitations were coded as challenges; and statements involving changes in the seaports’
resilience planning culture (e.g., resilience becomes a best management practice) were
coded as institutional developments. This process allowed for views and concepts to
emerge and be grouped into unique categories. To ensure reliability of the coding scheme,
we held two exercises in which several third-party individuals independently coded
selected passages of transcripts using our coding scheme. We then merged independently
coded files into Atlas.ti and calculated intercoder agreement using the Krippendorf’s Cualpha/cu-alpha coefficient, yielding a value of 0.796, suggesting very good agreement
(values between 0.40 - 0.8 are considered fair to very good agreement; Friese, 2019).
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4. Results & Discussion
This section presents the results from the data collection process described above.
Results are organized in the following subsections by the research question to which the
data pertain. Each subsection starts with an overview of the results, followed by analyses
and interpretations. When quoting participants, the following abbreviations are used if the
quote came from a director/manager, DIR; environmental specialist, ES; engineer, ENG;
or safety planner, SP, to ensure participant anonymity.

4.1 RQ1 – Key benefits/utilities of resilience assessment interventions
The first broad question this research intended to answer was: What are the key
benefits and challenges of undertaking resilience assessment interventions? As
demonstrated below, resilience assessment benefits mentioned in interviews correlated
significantly to the institutional capacities presented in the survey. For this reason, RQ3—
"To what extent do resilience assessments enhance seaport adaptive capacity?”—was used
to drive the analysis of the results pertaining to RQ1.
Through analyses of the 12 interviews with 26 key informants, we coded 102
statements of benefits that fell into one of eight discrete benefit/utility categories (Figure
3) as follows: the assessment provided a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding
the seaports’ vulnerabilities (mentioned by at least one informant from 90% of seaports);
the assessment process enhanced the seaports’ social capital with their internal and external
stakeholders (80%); the seaports’ leadership gained a greater awareness of the exigence for
resilience-building endeavors (60%); the seaport became more adept at funding resilience
(50%); the assessment process enhanced the seaports’ political efficacy in climate change
28

discourses (50%); the assessment became a boundary object (30%); and staff began
championing the seaports’ resilience-building initiatives (20%). The eight benefit/utilities
are described in detail in the next sections.

Figure 3 – Eight benefits associated with resilience assessments identified in 12 interviews with 26
seaport decision makers. Each colored pie is the percentage of seaports from which at least one
informant mentioned that benefit.

4.1.1 Benefit 1: The assessment provided a more comprehensive and nuanced
understanding the seaports’ vulnerabilities
Key informants from nine of the 10 case studies most frequently expressed the more
comprehensive and nuanced understanding of their seaports’ vulnerabilities as a benefit of
their assessments (24 mentions voiced by 14 informants). In many instances, informants
described their resilience assessment as their seaports’ first detailed investigation of their
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vulnerabilities. The impetuses to undertake these efforts were either a state mandate (as
was the case for four case studies, though some started adaptation planning voluntarily
prior); to obtain federal mitigation funding (two case studies); growing recognition of the
threats posed by climate change as evidenced by recent natural hazard events (one case
study); or for some other reason (three case studies). When asked the most beneficial
aspects of his seaport’s assessment, one informant answered,
“…we had never undertaken a study of that granularity, that got down to individual
assets. I'm not sure I inherited even a rudimentary understanding of the different
features, the different topographical shortcomings, if you will, when I got here. We
might have known anecdotally, ‘that intersection floods’ or ‘that building needs to be
built a little higher,’ or something like that, but I would not say we had a
comprehensive look at all those things together.” (SP, September 2020).
Interestingly, some informants felt that, along with identifying risks to take action on, their
resilience assessment revealed what not to worry about. As one environmental specialist
explained,
Well, here's one [example of something that was suspected to be a vulnerability but
turned out not to be]—the whole operation for unloading the cranes is to send a
boom out over the ship…The concern was that the clearance, the vertical clearance
for that boom over that ship, was going to disappear because of sea level rise. Well,
it didn't take us too long to show that, no, [that’s not going to happen]…I couldn't
put their mind at ease until I turned it into a formal study…” (ES, December 2020).
Several informants also valued the byproducts of the vulnerability assessment phase, such
as inventories of their seaport’s vulnerable assets or GIS-based inundation maps, as this
information allowed them to better understand the geographic extent of climate risk and
aided their roles in their respective departments. As one informant explained,
[The sea level rise map] is some of the most valuable information, for me, because
we do the maintenance on everything. It’s interesting to see where the floods will
hit first and just knowing what equipment we have that might be vulnerable in those
areas…So, if we start to see effects of inundation on something, it might have us
thinking about bringing it forward to engineering for a different design or some
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sort of capital project, moving forward to help address that.” (ENG, November
2020).
It was no surprise to find that the enhanced quality of vulnerability information was
most frequently emphasized as a benefit, given that one of the fundamental objectives of a
resilience assessment intervention is to elucidate this information in the first place. It is
also intuitive that informants would value a process that yields information about the
localized risk to their seaports’ future capital improvements, as this information enhances
their organizations’ capacities to satisfy their civic responsibilities of economic
development and facilitating trade. Previous research on seaport decision makers’
perceptions of climate change (Becker et al., 2012) and barriers to planning for it (Mclean
& Becker, 2019) may further explain why this benefit was most frequently mentioned.
Often, nuanced vulnerability information is lacking among seaports (Becker et al., 2012;
Mclean & Becker, 2019), serving as a broader barrier to the process of building resilience
and adapting (Moser et al., 2010). For example, in a 2012 study from Becker and
colleagues, more than half of seaport respondents felt that they were not sufficiently
“informed” about climate change impacts to their facilities. Years later, in interviews with
30 seaport decision makers, Mclean and Becker (2019) documented a widespread lack of
understanding of climate and natural hazard risks among a majority of their interviewed
seaports. Whether or not these findings explain our result, our result suggests that resilience
assessment interventions amend a widely recognized barrier to climate action at seaports.
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4.1.2 Benefit 2: The resilience assessment intervention enhanced seaports’ social capital
with their internal and external stakeholders, as (Benefit 3) the assessment became a
boundary object that prompted new dialogue
Twelve informants, representing eight of the ten participating seaports, found the
resilience assessment process to enhance their seaports’ social capital with internal and
external stakeholders (24 mentions; 12 informants). Social capital defines the “resources
embedded in relationships among actors” (Häuberer, 2011, p. 50), and can be thought of
as a function of the quality, quantity, and direction (i.e., horizontal or vertical) of
relationships of trust, reciprocity, and exchange within a system (Adger, 2003b; Djalante
et al., 2012; Häuberer, 2011). This study conceives social capital as being established
through collaborative fora that support multilateral dialogue and knowledge exchange
(Djalante et al., 2012; Häuberer, 2011)—in the seaport context, this may take the form of
a climate change working group, in which the seaport’s internal and external stakeholders
convene to discuss mutual concerns regarding future sea levels. Given the interrelatedness
of social capital and collaboration, informants mentioned the benefit of their seaports’
improved relationships as a byproduct of another interrelated benefit: the assessment
served as a boundary object, which describes a process, product, or other form that bridge
communities, stakeholders, and disciplines and lead to links from knowledge to action
(Star, 2010). Hence, these two benefits are considered together, as mention of one usually
coincided with mention of the other.
Informants remarked how the assessment enhanced social capital both during and after
resilience assessments were complete. Many of the informants felt that engaging key
stakeholders—especially during the preliminary assessment phases of scoping and
32

defining objectives—built social cohesion and trust amongst different departments and, in
some instances, with the external community. One informant remarked about how his
seaport’s inclusion of external stakeholders (city officials, NGOs, state governments, etc.)
in its assessment provided a systems perspective of vulnerability: “The biggest takeaway
for me in the whole process was involving all the players…If you keep it in-house, you
sometimes get tunnel vision, and you don't see the overall effects.” (SP, November 2020).
Another informant suggested the resilience assessment process’s role in promoting his
seaport as a centralized hazard information network for the surrounding community: “[The
assessment process] made us more of an information network . . . [our economic
development manager] is constantly sending emails out, or updates, from the weather
service or whoever it is—constantly sending it out to all of our stakeholders.” (DIR,
January 2021).
Moreover, our data revealed the potential of resilience assessment interventions to
facilitate common understandings and coordinated approaches to seaports’ resiliencebuilding efforts—ergo, their role as a boundary object. As one informant explained, “I
would argue that most of us were not really on the same page on how a port would
approach [climate change issues]. I think the workshop and the internal stakeholder
engagement in the development of the [assessment], really brought us together as a port
team.” (ES, October 2020). The ability of the resilience assessment to convene new actors
in conversations to which they otherwise would not be privy (or reluctant to participate in)
was also captured in our interviews. One group emphasized the importance of including
oil industry stakeholders in a workshop to identify the seaport’s strengths and weaknesses
in operations:
33

“The oil and gas business does not like to go into a room with any of their competitors
or anything… everybody was very suspicious, asking, “Wait, what do you want this
information for? Could this come back and hurt me?”, and stuff like that. So, [our
economic development manager] had to do a selling job just to try to get them in the
door to begin with.” (DIR, January 2021).
Again, our findings are consistent with previous research of seaport stakeholders’
perceptions of collaboration in seaport resilience efforts. Becker (2017), for example,
convened seaport stakeholders in workshops based on three boundary object scenarios,
revealing the utility of boundary objects as planning tools that facilitate critical thinking
amongst diverse stakeholder groups to better understand shared risk. Similarly, in
interviews with 25 stakeholders of the Port of Providence, Rhode Island, Becker and
Kretsch (2019) provide empirical results demonstrating perceptions of the value of
collaborative efforts as necessary to implementing resilience strategies.
The “wicked problems” presented by climate change require new avenues of
knowledge production and decision-making that involve collaborations between actors
from private and public sectors (Kates et al., 2001; Lynch et al., 2008). Benefits 2 and 3
are compelling in that they suggest the potential of resilience assessment interventions to
prompt adaptive governance approaches, which are built on an edifice of knowledge
exchange and polycentric decision-making (Djalante et al., 2012). While we cannot prove
the actualized resilience benefits of collaboration, we present two compelling studies that
do. In a case study of collaborative adaptation efforts in Hampton Roads, Virginia, Morris
(2020) found that Virginia Port Authority’s participation in regional climate change
working groups established relationships with members of academia, leading to a study
that produced downscaled sea level rise and storm surge models impacts for one of the
port’s terminals (McLeod et al., 2018). Interestingly, a similar collaboration with
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academia—involving the installation of wave sensors around the seaport to monitor ocean
conditions—was mentioned as a co-benefit of one case study’s assessment, which, as one
informant explained, “gave [his department] a platform to go ask for funding from [his]
management...’” (ES, September 2020). Perhaps more compelling are the findings from a
review of federal agency activities in MTS resilience for the 2017, 2018, and 2019
hurricane seasons (Murphy et al., 2020). Using empirical data, this report showcases the
strengthening of MTS resilience capacities (e.g, restoring pre-storm functionality) that
results from, inter alia, enhanced cross-agency coordination and data and information
exchange between seaports and external stakeholders.
4.1.3 Benefit 4: Leadership gained awareness of exigence for resilience-building/planning
Another benefit that was voiced in six of the 10 focus groups was the impact the
assessment process had on their seaports’ leadership (12 mentions; six informants).
Decision makers explained how, prior to their seaports’ assessments, their leadership did
not view resilience as a pressing matter that warranted capital expenditure, stymying longterm resilience-building efforts. When resilience assessments were presented to lead
decision makers, however, informants felt that they gained a heightened awareness of the
exigence for resilience-building. As one informant commented, “… in the past, there were
a lot of people at the port that weren't aware or were dismissive of climate change and the
hazards that it poses to us…after seeing the results of the study, I think it raises a couple
eyebrows to see [our main piers] underwater.” (DIR, October 2020). Several informants
felt that resilience assessment’s impact on leadership advanced the seaport’s longer-term
planning and resulted in greater likelihood of approvals for resilience funding. “I think
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going through this process and bringing it to the attention of the leadership of the port, it
brought us further into our master planning process, including resilience planning and
sustainability into our long-term planning aspect,” one environmental specialist remarked
(ES, September 2020). In the opinion of a director, “You show a couple inundation maps
to decision makers and they're more willing to approve funding.” (DIR, October 2020).
These insights appear less speculative when compared with the perspectives of the
leadership themselves. A Deputy Executive Director informant that participated in his
seaport’s assessment emphasized the importance of the assessment in bringing attention to
weaknesses in his seaport’s operations: “…anytime you go through an exercise like this,
even though you may think that you have all the boxes checked, you find out that you
don't…I think you just become more responsible to the safety, the mitigation—it just makes
you much more aware, and you pay closer attention.” (DIR, November 2021).
The finding that resilience assessment interventions may result in a more resilienceconscious and motivated leadership likely corresponds with the aforementioned benefit of
enhanced understanding of vulnerabilities. The information products that come out of
resilience assessments, such as SLR inundation maps, may add tangibility to impending
threats posed by climate change for leaders who are otherwise preoccupied with the shortterm concerns of running a public enterprise (Retchless, 2018; van Valkengoed & Steg,
2019). We find the leadership impacts of resilience assessments to be significant given the
key roles leaders play in the resilience-building process, such as incorporating resilience
considerations into policies and budgets, using deadlines to instill a sense of urgency
amongst their organization, introducing novel ways of thinking to identify solutions to
uncertain futures, providing information on new ideas, problems, and solutions to
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resilience partners, and building stakeholder networks (Stiller & Meijerink, 2015).
Moreover, institutional voids in leadership for resilience-building constitute a major
resilience-building barrier (Moser et al., 2010) that has been documented in seaport
organizations (Becker & Kretsch, 2019; Mclean & Becker, 2019). Our findings suggest
that resilience assessments may help transcend the obstacles presented by rigid
administration, and, in doing so, enhance seaport adaptive capacity.
4.1.4 Benefit 5: Resilience assessments enhanced seaports’ political efficacy in climate
change conversations; and Benefit 6: Seaports become more adept at funding resilience
projects
Five of the 10 case studies described their seaports’ enhanced political efficacy in
climate change conversations as a benefit of their resilience assessments (seven mentions;
five respondents). As those that oversee critical infrastructure, such as seaports, are
increasingly engaged in political conversations at local, state, and federal levels, the ability
to understand and influence climate-change related political affairs becomes paramount to
resilience-building. However, while engagement presents opportunities, it may also
challenge those who are not accustomed to the climate change jargon or concepts. One
safety planner explained that, prior to undertaking a resilience assessment, his organization
was “...very immature...in [its] ability to discuss [the issue of climate change] at the level
that we needed to have addressed.” (SP, September 2020). In the opinion of an
environmental specialist, undertaking the resilience assessment process enhanced his
management’s abilities to engage in political arenas:
“We deal with a number of agencies, including state agencies, and we deal a lot with
the Corps of Engineers...These issues, topics, and risk assessments and stuff are things
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that other people are doing, so [the resilience assessment] really gives us an ability to
communicate with them... [and it also] helps us in understanding what they're talking
about, or what they're looking at.” (ES, November 2020).
In several interviews, mentions of Benefit 5 coincided with mentions of another
benefit: divisions of the seaport became more adept at funding resilience projects (11
mentions; five informants). Informants explained that the ability to sway political decisions
in favor of resilience was enabled, at least in part, by the resilience assessment findings,
resulting in resilience projects receiving funding.
“If you've spent time working with companies, organizations, corporate America…
there's always something called the thump factor that plays a role, where you'll walk
into a room and plop down a stack of papers and say, ‘Look, I've done my homework,
give me half a million bucks to go take care of these things.’...having [the resilience
assessment] did enable us to master plan out resiliency-based improvements into our
six year master plan,” an engineer explained (ENG, September 2020).
In the same interview, his colleague, a Vice President, explained how his resilience
assessment helps market resilience related capital improvements:
“[Our director of engineering] talks about going to fight for money and he's competing
against our operations folks who have needs as far as equipment or other
elements…[We have] four competing pillars for capital dollars. If you can very clearly
illustrate why this feature, why a project, is important with respect to that kind of a
threat, I think that helps sell the project.” (SP, September 2020).
Both benefits have important implications for the role of resilience assessments in
facilitating adaptive capacity. Research on the role of social cognitive theory in climate
change adaptation suggests that individuals with robust efficacy beliefs are more likely to
engage in resilience-building endeavors (van Valkengoed & Steg, 2019). For example, a
study from Thaker and colleagues (2016) suggests that groups with high sense of efficacy
are more likely to set higher adaptation goals and mobilize resources for resilience. The
finding that several organizations’ political efficacy in climate change discourses
improved, suggests that, as a result of the resilience assessment intervention, decision
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makers become better poised to advocate for their seaports’ resilience needs—
corresponding with the adaptive capacity tenet of managerial ability (Smit & Wandel,
2006). This, in turn, may point to the significance of the discursive processes associated
with resilience assessments. By working with different departments and incorporating
climate change expertise (e.g., from consultants), seaport decision makers may learn how
to “talk the talk” of climate change. The improved abilities to mobilize and advocate
financial resources after the resilience assessment also have direct implications for seaport
adaptive capacity (Moser et al., 2019; Smit & Wandel, 2006) and support the utility value
of resilience assessment interventions.
4.1.5 Benefit 7: Resilience assessment formalized seaports’ resilience planning
approaches, which (Benefit 8) motivated staff to champion resilience projects of some case
studies
Two additional benefits were mentioned in conjunction with one another. Four
seaports valued how the resilience assessment formalized the seaport’s resilience planning
approach (eight mentions; four informants) and two felt that this formalization motivated
personnel from different divisions to champion resilience initiatives (four mentions; four
informants). In regard to benefit seven, informants explained that their seaports’ resilience
planning was largely an internal discussion with senior leadership or addressed by different
departments in isolation, prior to their resilience assessment intervention. Following an
intervention, however, resilience planning became more coordinated and standardized. An
engineer noted, “[The assessment] standardized how we approach projects from a
resiliency standpoint—not just now, but also in the future...You can't get to that point
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without starting somewhere, right? The assessment was kind of that “kindling for the fire,”
if you will.” (ENG, September 2020). Two informants in the same focus groups perceived
the assessment as a central document from which different departments of the seaport could
identify and execute resilience enhancements: “...we all do our individual piece, and
having to go, ‘Oh! Something that I can do is going to benefit my counterparts in a different
department’—[our assessment] helped to put all of that information in one place so that
any department could point to it and say, ‘alright, I can pick out the piece that matters to
me.’” (ES, November 2020). Another environmental specialist emphasized how his
seaports’ assessment gave resilience planning more credibility, motivating other divisions
of his department to support resilience-building projects:
“Three specific staffers [in our program management division] have really sort of
taken this role to help me out, to be my voice in the engineering team—because most
of the engineers don't want to listen to [an environmental specialist]. So, I have three
reps within our Program Management Division, who really sort of carry that torch on
[our port’s] climate programs.” (ES, October 2020).
Again, the significance of these resilience assessment benefits is highlighted when
compared with findings of Mclean and Becker (2019). Over half of the seaport decision
makers in their study acknowledged a governance disconnect—describing the lack of
coordination across sectors, or across levels of an organization, or both—as a key barrier
to their seaports’ resilience planning efforts. The governance disconnect barrier has been
found to result from the lack of a management plan for climate and extreme weather
adaptation (Moser et al., 2010). Benefit 7 clearly demonstrates the ability of resilience
assessments to fulfill this role. Additionally, governance disconnect may arise from
institutional crowdedness, resulting in a lack of clarity of responsibilities for adaptation at
local levels (Ekstrom & Moser, 2014; Mukheibir et al., 2013). Supported by Benefit 8, we
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posit that as resilience assessments formalize seaports’ resilience approaches, the multitude
of seaport divisions may better understand their roles in their seaports’ resilience-building
efforts, leading them to actively champion the work that pertains to their respective
departments.
4.1.6 Perceived changes in seaports’ capacities to manage system resilience
In the online pre-survey that informants completed before the focus group interview,
we measured informants’ perceptions of changes in their seaports’ capacities to plan for
and manage climate change, to further evaluate resilience assessment interventions. Figure
4 presents the aggregated pre- and post-resilience-assessment strengths of the 10
institutional capacities. The primary takeaway from these survey results was that each
capacity’s strength increased after the assessment (however, we found that not all
informants indicated a change after their assessment). On average, seaports’ commitment
to resilience-building endeavors was strongest before (3.7, moderate-to-strong) and after
(4.4, strong-to-very-strong) the intervention. The other indicators’ pre- and postassessment strengths were generally similar; most increased from moderate to strong after
the assessment. In terms of percent change in strength, the greatest increase (27.4%) was
in resources sharing with external stakeholder groups, followed by internal collaboration
(26.4%), external collaboration (25.4%), internal resources sharing (23.9%), leadership
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presence (22.6%), data quality (20.8%), financial resource availability (19.7%),
commitment (18.5%), data availability (15.8%), and staff availability (14.3%).

Figure 4 – Average strengths of key institutional capacities prior to (light grey) and after (dark grey)
completion of resilience assessments.

The coincidence that informants mentioned nearly all 10 adaptive capacity indicators
as benefits further validates our interview findings. For example, the increased strength in
data quality and availability corresponds with Benefit 1–more holistic understanding of
seaport vulnerabilities; or, the increased strength in financial resource availability reiterates
Benefit 6—seaports became more adept at funding resilience. Together, the survey and
interview data have important implications for the role of resilience assessments in building
adaptive capacity. In particular, we find Benefit 2—enhanced social capital—and the
increased strength of internal and external collaboration and resource sharing, to be
significant. The role of social capital in enhancing coping capacity and reducing
vulnerability is well-recognized in resilience literature, as vertical and horizontal
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exchanges amongst agencies can build networks and help institutions avoid maladaptation
(Adger et al., 2005; Bostick et al., 2017; Djalante et al., 2012).

4.2 RQ1 – Key challenges/limitations of resilience assessment interventions
Along with benefits, this study also sought to highlight key challenges of executing
resilience assessments and/or the limitations of their utility for planning. In total, we coded
56 statements that fell into one of 21 discrete categories of challenges. Because of the
comparatively large number of challenges, we included only those that were mentioned by
at least two case studies in our analysis. However, we view the breadth of challenges to be
noteworthy because it reflects the highly contextual nature of resilience assessments
considered in this study, and in general. The following four challenges (Error! Reference s
ource not found.) are considered in the subsequent discussion: engaging stakeholders
complicated the execution of various phases of the resilience assessment (70%); addressing
vulnerabilities that lacked scientifically robust data (30%); the lack of an archetype
resilience assessment model challenged the organization of the assessment (20%); and
communicating vulnerability findings to tenants or external stakeholders could negatively
impact the seaports’ marketability (20%).
4.2.1 Challenge 1: Engaging stakeholders complicated the execution of various phases of
the resilience assessment
The most frequently mentioned challenge of resilience assessment interventions
involved engaging stakeholders (20 mentions; 10 informants). In most instances, mentions
of stakeholder-engagement-related challenges were associated with the seaports’ internal
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stakeholder groups (as most seaports only included internal stakeholders in their
assessments), though some mentioned engagement challenges with external stakeholders.
Table 4 – Four main challenges mentioned in 12 interviews with 26 seaport decision makers
Challenge

Example

1. Engaging stakeholders
(different priorities, scheduling
conflicts, etc.)

“It was difficult to talk to people, to get them to speak back to you,
and give you information. Many of the commercial stakeholders
think that everything they do is proprietary information…”

2. Addressing hazards that
lacked scientifically robust
data

“What was really challenging is the areas that don't have a lot of
good data…you start talking about sea level rise–I'm either going
to be at 19 feet elevation or I'm going to be four feet under. So,
which do you start to try to plan for?”.

3. The lack of an archetype
resilience assessment model
challenged the organization of
the assessment

4. Communicating
vulnerability findings to
stakeholders could negatively
impact seaports’
marketability

“[The assessment] was a challenge because we were kind of
starting fresh, with a new thing…I needed something to go on, some
sort of adaptation plan template…and it just simply didn't exist…”

“…some port leaders have felt like, ‘If we start showing these maps
of sea level rise, is that going to deter investment into our
waterfront?’…are these investment groups going to say, ‘Oh my
gosh, [that port] is going to be flooded!’?”.

Our data reveal that stakeholder engagement was a challenge in all phases of the resilience
assessment process. For example, during the preliminary organization of the assessment,
convening stakeholders was complicated by schedule conflicts or their views that the
assessment was not worthy of their time. One safety planner remarked about the difficulty
of conveying to stakeholders the value of participating in an exercise with no immediate or
tangible benefits, as processes like disaster mitigation and prevention are “difficult to
measure” (SP, November 2020). Additionally, resilience assessment interventions
necessitate discussion of vulnerabilities, often requiring participants to disclose sensitive
information, which they may be reluctant to do. A safety planner who organized his
44

seaport’s assessment explained how, “It was difficult to talk to people, to get them to speak
back to you, and give you information. Many of the commercial stakeholders think that
everything they do is proprietary information, even though it benefits everybody...To get
them to open up about those processes might help other people.” (SP, September 2020).
Scoping the assessment and defining objectives were also noted as bureaucratically
cumbersome. For example, one informant mentioned the challenge of reaching consensus
among his seaport’s myriad stakeholder groups regarding the appropriate climate scenarios
to plan for. As he explained,
“We just had a range of projections, like from zero to thirty-six inches or
something like that...I would talk to our former management about projections,
and they were just like, ‘Well, why would you choose this number over that
number?’. And if I said, ‘Well, maybe we should go with a higher number,’
they would respond, ‘But why would you do that? What's the probability of
that occurring?’. And so, it was really, really confusing to deal with that.”
(ES, September 2020).
Following the completion of their seaports’ assessments, several informants
emphasized the challenge of communicating the assessment findings to stakeholders and
educating them about how to use the assessment. One environmental specialist commented,
“...making sure that we're effectively communicating what's going on, like, how to use the
science, how to use guidance, and explaining what a projection is—all of that stuff is still
challenging in different ways...whether it's with external stakeholders or even within the
port.” (ES, September 2020). Two other focus groups’ participants were challenged in
their efforts to continue dialogue about the assessment after it was complete or raise
awareness of the assessment to other departments that had not participated. In the opinion
of informant,
“...even when talking to some of our capital project managers about how to
incorporate some of the recommendations in this plan into their project planning,
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there's kind of a disconnect there. Like, they weren't even necessarily aware that there
were strategies that could specifically relate to their projects in this plan…It's a big
institutional issue to get this on their radar.” (ES, December 2020).
The challenge of coordinating a multitude of actors with individual interests in
resilience affairs is documented in seaport (Becker, 2017) and in non-seaport resilience
literature. Sellberg and colleagues (2015) report the convening of a diverse stakeholder set
to participate in an urban planning resilience assessment, as a key challenge with resilience
assessments. In interviews with Australian natural resource management practitioners who
undertook resilience planning, Sellberg, Peterson, and Borgström (2018) identified the
involvement of different organizational departments in the development of a resilience
plan, as a primary challenge of resilience planning. Similarly, interviews with city officials
leading their cities’ resilience plans underscore the difficulty of reaching consensus on the
starting point for resilience-building and the definition of resilience to operationalize when
multiple interests are engaged (Fastiggi et al., 2020). This challenge is even noticed as a
barrier in the adaptation planning process in synthesis research investigating myriad
adaptation contexts (Moser et al., 2010).
4.2.2 Challenge 2: Addressing vulnerabilities that lacked scientifically robust data
While the most commonly mentioned resilience assessment benefit was the enhanced
vulnerability information, some informants acknowledged the limitations of the
information their assessments provided. Some case studies completed their assessments
over five years ago, when, as several informants mentioned, the science for certain climate
hazards was less accurate and available as more recent times. Informants from three focus
groups felt that the lack of accurate, locally relevant climate hazard data (e.g., sea level rise
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projections) limited their seaports’ abilities to identify and plan for those respective hazards
(four mentions; four informants). As one environmental specialist explained,
“The other thing that was really challenging is the areas that don't have a lot of good
data, or where the data or science isn't really on a fairly narrow focus. [For some
hazards], there's pretty good information on what will happen. But then, you start
talking sea level rise—like, my house is sitting at 21 feet of elevation, and depending
on which graph and chart you're using, in 50 years, I'm either going to be at 19 feet
elevation or 20 feet elevation or I'm going to be four feet under. So, which do you start
to try to plan for?” (ES, November 2020).
Another informant, whose seaport completed its assessment in 2010, similarly noted,
“I think [the science] was the key weakness that I saw when I started looking at the
assessment. [Our assessment] is largely focused on sea level rise and potential storm
surge from hurricanes because, at the time, that was the science that was available.
So, there wasn't a lot of science about how frequent and how severe every rainstorm
might become because of climate change…or the impact of extreme heat on either
infrastructure or personnel.” (ES, November 2020).
The finding that only three case studies mentioned this limitation is noteworthy.
Though many case studies had completed their assessments more recently, and thus had
access to more accurate scientific information, this does not mean that uncertainties did not
exist in their information products. For this reason, it was anticipated that this challenge
would be more frequently mentioned. There are many propositions that could explain why
more case studies did not emphasize this challenge, though none can be proved empirically.
For example, greater confidence in recent climate science (Reidmiller et al., 2017) may
have provided those decision makers with more recently completed assessments a greater
sense of assurance in the vulnerability findings that came out of their assessment. Just as
likely, due to the open-ended nature of the interview questions, other challenges may have
been more palpable to the focus groups; hence, the absence of a mention of this challenge
does not mean that it was not a challenge. Whatever the reason, this challenge suggests the
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administrative imperative of embedding flexibility in seaport policies and management to
account for emerging information.
4.2.3 Challenge 3: The lack of an archetype resilience assessment model challenged the
organization of the assessment
Several informants noted how the resilience assessment intervention that their seaport
undertook was different than conventional planning procedures, for example, because of
the larger time horizons considered or the integration of numerous stakeholder groups.
Informants from two case studies expressed the difficulty of organizing a planning process
with which they had little experience and that had no archetype to reference, as a challenge
(three mentions; three informants). In the opinion of one informant,
“Most challenging to start was that [the assessment] was something brand new. I
contacted other representatives up and down the West Coast and East Coast…I needed
something to go on, some sort of adaptation plan…and it just simply didn't exist…So,
it was really a challenge because we were kind of starting fresh, with a new thing.”
(ES, October 2020).
Another informant from the same seaport explained that, “Usually, when we're doing risk
assessments and things like that, it’s an established process. The resilience
assessment/planning process was kind of invented as you go.” (DIR, December 2020).
Unsurprisingly, when asked how they would execute their resilience assessments
differently knowing what they do now, informants explained that they would seek advice
from colleagues at other seaports that had already undertaken a similar effort.
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4.2.4 Challenge 4: Communicating vulnerability findings to tenants or external
stakeholders could negatively impact the seaports’ marketability
An unanticipated challenge mentioned in two focus group interviews was
communicating the resilience assessment results in a manner that would not harm the
seaports’ marketability to future lessees and investors (two mentions; two informants).
Informants that mentioned this challenge felt that disclosing information about their
seaports’ vulnerabilities to external stakeholder groups may deter investment into their
lands. For one informant’s seaport, this concern prompted a change in the resilience
assessment methodology. As he explained,
“The larger challenge was figuring out how to do a plan without scaring the
tenants…We actually stopped our planning process at one point...We were going down
the route of doing vulnerability assessments per pier or per wharf. That's where we
kind of stopped and said, ‘That's going to be really scary to a tenant or even our own
staff.’ And so, we kind of stepped back and then we revamped our process and our
approach a little bit, to look at the [vulnerabilities of] systems.” (ES, September
2020).
In the opinion of another environmental specialist,
“…some people in the past have felt like, ‘If we start showing these maps of sea level rise,
is that going to deter investment into our waterfront?’…are these investment groups—that
come in and build parks, hotels, and our waterfront amenities—are they going to say, ‘Oh
my gosh, [that port] is going to be flooded!’” (ES, September 2020).
As discussed earlier, U.S. port authorities and agencies act as “public enterprises” that
have civic responsibilities while also competing to secure market share, market their
services, and facilitate economic development via private enterprise (Fawcett, 2007).
Therefore, decision makers that wish to undertake a resilience assessment or similar
initiative may want to include a communication strategy for navigating the potential
publicity issues of disclosing vulnerabilities. Unlike the three previous challenges, we find
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this challenge to be less generalizable, as the public-private duality that characterizes many
seaports distinguishes them from other entities (e.g., natural resource management
agencies).

4.3 RQ2 – Resilience enhancement strategies that seaports implement after undertaking
resilience assessments
The second objective of this research was to identify the types of resilience
enhancement strategies that seaports implemented as a result of their resilience assessment
interventions. The research team considered this inquiry for two reasons: (1) documenting
the resilience-building actions that seaports take after going through an assessment,
captures the tangible impacts of the resilience assessment on the case studies (at least in
some capacity); and (2) analyzing informants’ opinions of whether or not their seaport was
likely to identify or implement a given strategy, allows us to further evaluate the utility (or
lack thereof) of resilience assessments.
4.3.1 Implemented resilience enhancement strategies
We counted 155 discrete strategies from eight of the 10 case studies’ resilience
assessment documents3 (and several others during interviews) (Figure 5). Of these 155,
we found that construction and design strategies were most frequently mentioned
(Nm=60) and implemented (Ni=25); however, no statistically significant difference in
terms of implementation, existed between the six typologies (p = 0.689, Fisher’s exact

3

Resilience assessment document from two of the case studies mentioned no resilience enhancement
strategies, as this was beyond the scope of their specific approaches. Therefore, these were left out of the
count.
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test, two-sided). Construction and design strategies comprised developing and
implementing physical changes either on or off the seaport. The most frequently
Assessment Influenced
Implementation
Resilience Enhancement
Category (# of Mentions)

Strategy (# of Mentions)

% Implemented

Reinforce structures with more weather-durable materials (16)
Improve and/or install new stormwater management infrastructure (11)
CONSTRUCTION AND
DESIGN (60)

Elevate existing structures (9)
Construct barriers around individual structures (9)
Replace or relocate buildings/structures
Armor structures

(5)
(4)

Bury critical power infrastructure under the ground

(2)

Implement (re)development projects

(2)

Modify grades of important lands

(2)

Undertake measures to enhance redundancy in power supply (11)
Reinforce/identify location for emergency storage areas to house critical assets (8)
EMERGENCY
PREPARATION, RESPONSE,
AND RECOVERY (31)

Implement measures to allow employees to access work portal/systems during critical weather conditions remotely

(5)

Continually update emergency response plans

(2)

Develop an emergency operations and response plan that includes education and training materials

(2)

Build safe room shelters in Port facilities to house the Port population during disasters

(1)

Develop a warning system for notifying the Port personnel and tenants of an imminent natural hazard threat

(1)

Upgrade surveillance monitoring equipment

(1)

Implement/upgrade environmental conditions or damage monitoring systems to evaluate risks to Port (10)
RESEARCH (28)

Investigate any necessary infrastructure maintenance/upgrades/replacements (7)
Perform a critical system vulnerability/performance study (6)
Create (vulnerable) asset inventory

(2)

Identify funding streams to support adaptation

(2)

Monitor and inventory environmental assets/quality and identify strategies to protect, enhance, and adapt to future SLR

(1)

Participate in/establish climate-change-related working groups (6)

NETWORKS AND NEW WAYS
OF THINKING (19)

LONG RANGE PLANNING
(10)

BUILDING CODES & LAND
USE REGULATIONS (8)

Engage with external stakeholders on climate-change-resilience-building or planning endeavors

(3)

Engage with internal stakeholders on climate-change-resilience-building or planning endeavors

(3)

Share climate change knowledge (inundation maps, vulnerabilities, report updates, etc.) with stakeholders

(2)

Develop leadership vision and goals for the Port that are resilience-focused

(1)

Adopt an adaptive management approach to addressing climate change vulnerabilities

(1)

Educate stakeholders on risks of climate change to port

(1)

Engage with tenants on climate-change-resilience-building or planning endeavors

(1)

Incorporate climate change resilience considerations into policies/official documents

(6)

Update terminal leasing requirements to reference resilience assessment/incorporate climate change considerations

(1)

Make map of port-wide vulnerability zone based on SLR projection of concern

(1)

Monitor climate science and revisit vulnerable asset inventory periodically

(1)

Add climate change language to future Port RFP's/RFQ's

(1)

Incorporate resilience considerations into design and permitting guidelines (6)
Modify electrical installation best practices to ensure power system resilience

(1)

Modify stormwater drainage design parameters to include climate change

(1)
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Figure 5 – Heat map of mentioned resilience enhancement strategies that respondents indicated had
been/will be implemented, may be implemented, and will not be implemented after completing a
resilience assessment. Strategy font size correlates with total number

mentioned strategy of this type was reinforcing structures, such as terminal assets, with
more durable materials (Nm=16); however, this strategy was also most frequently marked
as unsure, owing to one case study’s non-response to this section of the survey. The most
frequently implemented strategy of the construction and design typology was stormwater
management infrastructure improvements (Ni=9). Following construction and design
strategies, we identified 31 total emergency preparation, response, and recovery
strategies; 28 research strategies; 18 networks and new ways of thinking strategies; 10
long range planning strategies; and eight building codes and land use regulations
strategies. In terms of total quantities implemented, research strategies were the next most
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implemented (Ni=12) after construction and design, followed by networks and new ways
of thinking strategies (Ni=11), emergency preparation, response, and recovery (Ni=11),
long range planning (Ni=6), and, finally, building codes and land use regulation (Ni=4).
4.3.2 Influence of the resilience assessment on strategy identification and/or
implementation
Few informants indicated the likelihood of their seaports’ identifying or implementing
specific strategies in the absence of their resilience assessments. Most respondents either
left this section blank or answered “unsure.” We counted only the responses indicating that
implementation of a given strategy was likely—suggesting that the resilience assessment
did not influence that area of the seaport’s resilience portfolio—and not likely—suggesting
that the resilience assessment introduced the seaport to areas of resilience improvement.
Overall, the informants found their resilience assessments to have the greatest influence on
the implementation of monitoring systems that continually track environmental conditions
(such as sea level height) or infrastructure damage, which fell under the research typology.
By contrast, most respondents felt that participating in or establishing a climate changerelated working group or ad-hoc committee was likely to be an implemented strategy in
the absence of the assessment.
4.3.3 Interpretation of survey results
It is difficult to glean insights from the survey results. The insignificant difference
between implemented resilience enhancement typologies may suggest that resilience
enhancement strategies are too case-specific for cross-seaport comparisons. The inability
of most informants to indicate whether implementation was likely in the absence of the
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resilience assessment, may indicate a weakness in the survey instrument to address the
sought inquiry—the question may have been too speculative for informants. One potential
explanation of why construction and design strategies were most frequently mentioned and
implemented, is that infrastructure improvements and modifications are going to be
pursued regardless of climate change. Without functional infrastructure, the seaport’s
capacity to facilitate the transfer of cargo is compromised; thus, having resilient
infrastructure is merely complementary to the seaport’s mission.
Greater speculation is required to explain what our survey results suggest about the
resilience philosophies of our case studies and how. We may posit that the scope and
objectives of a resilience assessment may represent the resilience capacities that are salient
to the entity undertaking the intervention, which will, in turn, influence the selection of
strategies. For example, a seaport that endeavors to identify the key vulnerabilities of its
facilities (as many in this study have done)—with little consideration of the human
dimensions of its operations—is likely to consider hard resilience strategies (e.g., seawalls
and elevating terminals) over soft strategies (e.g., incorporating resilience into
management protocols). Considering that construction strategies were most frequently
identified and implemented, it is possible that our seaport sample conceives resilience as
the capacity to sustain perturbations more so than preparing for or adapting to them. This
conclusion may have some support from the literature—when asked which strategies their
seaports could implement to be more resilient, seaport stakeholder interviewees in a study
from Becker and Caldwell (2015) identified mostly construction and design strategies. Yet,
if the frequency of strategy mentions is considered in isolation, the finding that construction
and emergency management strategies were most frequently mentioned, may suggest that
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seaports conceive the capacities to “sustain” and “recover” from perturbations as resilience
instead of learning and adapting. When considering only frequency of implementation, the
finding that construction and research strategies were most frequently implemented,
suggests different conclusions. Regardless, further research is needed to support either
conclusion.
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5. Limitations of this research
It is important to acknowledge some of the limitations of this research. Firstly, our
sampling approach introduces limitations that reflect the challenges of seaport research
more broadly. The variability in positions and responsibilities across our 26 informants
undoubtedly impacts their perceptions of the resilience assessment process and introduces
bias into the data. Informants also had varying degrees of participation in their seaports’
resilience assessments, which limited our ability to collect their insights on them. Further,
we represent only several persons’ perspectives for each seaport which are not
representative of each organization. Given that interviewees are members of competitive
public enterprises with the responsibility of good publicity, it is possible that interviewees
may have provided limited or positive-skewing information as well.
Our research design also limits the reliability of our conclusions regarding the impacts
of resilience assessments. Decisions to collaborate with external organizations or
implement resilience-related capital improvements, are not made in a vacuum; hence, we
cannot infer a direct causality between the implementation of a given strategy and the
resilience assessment, for example. At times, informants explained that the resilience
assessment coincided with other resilience initiatives going on at their seaport and
acknowledged that their responses to the survey questions were speculative.
Lastly, we recognize the potential limitations associated with our analyses of the focus
group data. Using the focus group as the unit of analysis, as we have, may preclude the
analysis of dissenter opinions and lead to misinformed analytical generalizations
(Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009). In future iterations of this work, the authors suggest that
researchers should, wherever possible, delineate information about the number or
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proportion of focus group members who appeared to be part of the consensus from which
a given category or theme emerged as well as the number or proportion of members who
were of dissenting view or did not contribute to the category or theme.
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6. Conclusions
This research constitutes a novel contribution to literature on resilience assessments
and the operationalization of resilience concepts in practice. To date, resilience planning is
significantly understudied in seaport and non-seaport environments and, to our knowledge,
there is no study in the emerging body of resilience planning literature that evaluates
resilience interventions through considers key players’ perceptions and the actions taken
after interventions. Using 10 seaports as case studies of resilience planning through
interventions, we document key benefits and challenges of resilience assessments that are
consistent with the literature. Noteworthy benefits included the enhanced social capital
developed between the seaport and its stakeholders and leaders’ improved awareness of
the exigence of resilience-building. By contrast, involving internal and/or external
stakeholders also presented significant challenges to the execution of the seaports’
resilience assessments. We demonstrate how our results, such as seaports’ increased
information sharing capacities and improved external relationships after their assessments,
have implications for enhanced climate change resilience and adaptive capacity.
Furthermore, we find the insights captured in this work to be valuable sources of
information for users of the CISA’s and ERDC’s Resilience Assessment Guidebook for
Ports and the Maritime Transportation System, to which this study is contributing. Future
extensions of this work should expand our experimental design to include inferential
statistical analyses—for example, we are inspired by the work of Fu (2020), who used
correlation analyses to quantify the relationship between the types and numbers of
implemented resilience enhancement strategies with similar institutional capacities as
those presented in our work (e.g., financial resources, staff availability, leadership, political
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environment, and data availability). Additionally, the use of standardized quantification
methodologies to compare measures of pre- and post-resilience assessment strengths in
organizational resilience may complement the findings presented in this work.
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7. Appendix
Appendix A. Table of seaports considered but not included in study
Port of

Resilience Assessment
Completed?

Why not included?

Miami (FL)

No

No port-centric resilience assessment completed.
Port is currently in the process of undertaking one.

New York and New Jersey

Yes

Unable to participate due to the COVID-19
pandemic

New Orleans (LA)

No

No formal resilience assessment. Port has
undertaken many other initiatives in the realm of
hurricane preparedness.

Everglades (FL)

No

No formal resilience assessment. Port is currently
in the process of undertaking an assessment.

Houston (TX)

No

No formal resilience assessment. Port has
undertaken many other initiatives in the realm of
hurricane preparedness.

Alabama State Port Authority (AL)

Yes

Port had participated in the Mobile, Alabama
Regional Resilience Assessment Program but staff
that were present for the assessment are no longer
with the port

Portsmouth (NH)

Yes

Port had participated in the Port of Portsmouth
Regional Resilience Assessment Program but staff
that were present for the assessment are no longer
with the port

Yes

Port had participated in the Puerto Rico Regional
Resilience Assessment Program but staff that were
present for the assessment are no longer with the
port

San Juan (PR)

Port had participated in the Casco Bay Resilience
Assessment Program but staff that were present for
the assessment are no longer with the port
authority

Maine Port Authority (ME)
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Appendix B. Survey instrument
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Appendix C. Interview questionnaire
Date:
Port title:
Participant Number:
[Mention before proceeding]:
I will ask questions with open-ended responses. The questions will concern your
participation in the work associated with the [TITLE OF RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT
DOCUMENT]. If at any point you would like to stop the interview, you are welcome to
indicate this to me.
Demographic Information
Job title:
Years served at current port:
Other ports where you have been employed:
General introductory questions
What initially prompted your port to conduct the [TITLE OF RESILIENCE
ASSESSMENT]?
How did the resilience assessment differ from previous planning initiatives you have
taken part in?
Personal/perceptual changes
What new perspectives did you gained after participating in the resilience assessment that
have benefited your work as [JOB TITLE]? (E.g., More detailed understanding of your
port’s vulnerabilities? New appreciation for collaborations?)
[If yes] Please elaborate.
Are there any specific activities/procedures of the resilience assessment process that you
believe contributed to these changes?
[If yes] Please elaborate and explain why.
Impressions of the resilience assessment: benefits/usefulness
In your opinion, what activities/procedures of the resilience assessment process were
most useful for the port as a whole?
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What do you believe were the two or three most valuable takeaways from the resilience
assessment for the port as a whole? [To help guide their thought process, use example: If
a colleague at another port was interested in undertaking a resilience assessment and
wanted your insights about it, what experiences would you want to highlight as most
beneficial for their port?]
Was there any new information that came out of the assessment that was previously
unavailable and sought after for decision-making?
[If yes] Please elaborate.
Impressions of the resilience assessment: challenges/uselessness
Were there any specific activities/procedures of the resilience assessment that you found
to be less useful for the port as a whole?
[If yes] Please elaborate.
What was most challenging about the resilience assessment process?
[If yes] Please elaborate.
Was there information that the resilience assessment didn’t provide that could have
helped your decision-making?
[If yes] Please elaborate.
Were there any challenges that your port was having with executing its resilienceenhancing initiatives that you believe the resilience assessment did not amend?
Do you believe any of the challenges/limitations of the resilience assessment process
have led your port to turn away from certain REOs that were identified in the resilience
report?
[If yes] Please elaborate.
What advice would you give to another port that wanted to execute a resilience
assessment?
Institutional changes after the resilience assessment
After completing the resilience assessment, how does your port plan for natural hazards
differently than before the assessment? (E.g. New planning time horizons considered?)
Have you noticed any changes in the decision-making processes of your port/department
when planning for natural hazards? (E.g., Are different people included? More
calculated/less reactionary?)
[If yes] Please elaborate.
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Are there any other institutional developments prompted by the resilience assessment that
you have seen applied to other projects the port is working on that aren’t resiliencerelated?
[If yes] Please elaborate.
Follow-up
Given the topic at hand, is there anything else you would like to point out or anything that
you think was missing from our conversation?
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